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Abstract:  
 
Using matched employer-employee level data drawn from the 2004 UK Workplace and Employee 
Relations Survey, we explore the determinants of a measure of worker commitment and loyalty (CLI) 
and whether CLI influences workplace performance. Our empirical findings suggest that the 
employee’s industry-occupation specific relative wage is an important factor influencing employee 
attitudes towards the workplace. Other factors influencing employee commitment and loyalty are age 
and tenure, whilst workplace level characteristics of importance are: supervision; performance related 
pay and long term employment prospects within the workplace. With respect to the effects of employee 
commitment and loyalty upon the workplace, higher CLI is associated with enhanced workplace 
performance. This result holds for a number of robustness checks, thereby highlighting a hitherto 
neglected conduit for improved workplace performance. Our findings that employer characteristics 
influence employee commitment and loyalty suggest that workplaces may be able to exert some 
influence over the commitment and loyalty of its workforce, which, in turn, may affect workplace 
performance. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
A large empirical literature exists which explores the determinants of organisational 
performance. For example, Machin and Stewart (1990), McNabb and Whitfield 
(1998) and Munday et al. (2003) examine the determinants of financial performance, 
whilst Griliches and Regev (1995), Oulton (1998) and Griffiths and Simpson (2004) 
focus on the determinants of labour productivity. Many such studies are based on firm 
level data. One might argue, however, that, in order to understand the determinants of 
firm performance, it is important to also analyse employee level information given 
that the behaviour of employees and the decisions they make may influence 
workplace performance. In this paper, we investigate whether the level of employee 
attachment to the employer influences workplace performance using matched 
employer-employee data. To be specific, we ascertain whether worker commitment 
and loyalty influence labour productivity and financial performance at the firm-level. 
In addition, we explore the determinants of such employee attitudes towards the 
organisation for which they work in order to ascertain how such attachments may be 
fostered. 
The concept of organisational commitment has attracted a great deal of 
interest in the human resource management and psychology literatures. For example, 
employee commitment and loyalty are a central feature in the high performance 
workplace literature in which they are seen as mediating factors linking different 
types of human resource management and employment practices to enhanced 
performance. In this context, Meyer and Allen (1991) distinguish three dimensions to 
organisational commitment: affective commitment; normative commitment; and 
continuance commitment. Affective commitment captures an employee’s emotional 
attachment to, identification with and involvement in the organisation, whilst 
normative commitment relates to an employee’s obligation to remain in the 
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organisation, i.e. an employee’s loyalty to their employer. Finally, continuance 
commitment is related to an employee’s economic ties to the organisation and the 
employee’s perceived costs of leaving the firm.  
Meyer et al. (1993) argue that strong affective commitment to an organisation 
arises because employees share values with both the organisation and its members 
and is therefore predicted to have the strongest positive association with job 
performance, (see also Meyer et al., 2002). With affective commitment, employees 
remain with their employer because they choose to do so. Green (2007) argues that, 
from an economist’s perspective, affective commitment can be regarded as a proxy 
for the utility associated with working for the current employer as compared to doing 
the same job with the next best employer, thereby establishing firm-specific utility. 
As such, an employee’s firm-specific utility potentially plays an important role in 
employee decision-making and workplace behaviour. 
Since one might expect an employee’s attachment to their firm to influence 
their supply of effort, which in turn may influence firm performance, it is surprising 
that employee commitment and loyalty have attracted only limited attention in the 
economics literature.1 This is especially so given that employees’ decisions over their 
supply of effort play a key role in various incentive models of worker compensation 
(for example, Lazear, 2000) as well as in the efficiency wage literature (see Akerlof, 
1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). In many such models, employee commitment and 
loyalty play an important role in the principal-agent issues surrounding the separation 
between the ownership and control of an organisation. The costs associated with 
delegated decision-making clearly depend on the extent to which the interests of the 
principal and agent differ (see, for example, Aghion and Tirole, 1997, and Athey and 
                                                 
1 Previous studies include, inter alia, Lazear (1991), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Prendergast (1995) and 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000). 
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Roberts, 2001).  In so far as employees who exhibit commitment and loyalty to their 
employer may have interests, which are aligned with that of their employer, the 
agency costs often associated with the employee-employer relationship are reduced.  
 One attempt to construct an economic model of identity and work incentives 
thus capturing such motivations, which are often missing in the standard economic 
model where an individual’s preferences are fixed and primarily depend on monetary 
and effort considerations, is Akerlof and Kranton (2005). Their analysis, within a 
principal-agent framework, suggests that instilling in employees ‘a sense of identity 
and attachment to an organisation is critical to well-functioning enterprises’. 
Furthermore, the role of pay as a way to motivate employees is less important if the 
employee is loyal and committed to the firm. Within the theoretical framework 
proposed by Akerlof and Kranton (2005), the worker adopts an identity as part of the 
organisation and his/her utility is reduced if he/she does not act in the best interests of 
the organisation, thereby reducing both the wage differential (associated with reward 
versus punishment) required to induce additional effort and the amount of costly 
monitoring undertaken by the employer. Moreover, since identification with the firm 
may lower average wages, a firm may find it profitable to create a sense of identity 
and attachment, i.e. engender loyalty and commitment, amongst its workforce. 
 In addition, establishing a committed and loyal workforce may be associated 
with enhanced firm performance and profits if the firm also benefits from less 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of employees without recompense to high 
incentive wages or costly levels of monitoring (Green, 2007). Furthermore, Green 
(2000) argues that a firm’s human capital should be regarded as comprising social as 
well as technical skills which both influence productivity. Technical skills are 
regarded as the ability to convert inputs into outputs, whilst social skills are regarded 
as the extent to which employees act in a way that is aligned with the firm’s 
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objectives. The importance of social skills in the hiring of employees is demonstrated 
by the use of personality and attitude tests as well as performance or competency tests 
during the hiring process (Brown and Sessions, 2006). Moreover, Green (2007) 
argues that organisational commitment is a social skill as it is associated with 
workplace behaviour in accordance with attaining the firm’s objectives. One would, 
therefore, predict that such social skills would be positively associated with employee 
effort, which, in turn, would enhance firm performance. 
In so far as the degree of commitment and loyalty of employees towards their 
employer is fundamentally linked to the way in which employees conduct themselves 
at the workplace the economic considerations and implications are clear. A committed 
and loyal workforce may require less incentive pay or supervision to supply effort to 
their employer, thereby lowering employment costs and enhancing firm performance. 
Given that employee commitment and loyalty clearly influence the agency 
considerations, which underpin the relationship between employees and employers, 
the lack of interest by economists in these important attributes of employees is 
surprising especially given the vast economic literature relating to principal-agent 
considerations within the workplace. In what follows, we firstly explore the 
determinants of such employee attitudes at the employee level. Secondly, we explore 
the implications of employee commitment and loyalty upon financial performance 
and productivity at the firm level, which contrasts with the focus in the management 
and psychology literature, which lies in the relationship between employee 
commitment and job performance rather than firm performance. 
2. Data 
In order to explore the relationship between employee commitment, loyalty and firm 
performance, we analyse data from the 2004 Workplace and Employee Relations 
Survey (WERS). This is the fifth in a Government funded series of surveys conducted 
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at British workplaces, the previous four surveys having been conducted in 1980, 
1984, 1990 and 1998. The aim of these surveys is to provide nationally representative 
data on the current state of workplace relations and employment practices in Britain, 
and it is widely regarded as the principal source of information pertaining to changes 
in British industrial relations [Chaplin et al. (2005)]. The survey population for the 
2004 WERS is all British workplaces with at least five employees except for those in 
agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying, private households 
with employed persons, and extra-territorial organisations. The sample comprises 
2,295 workplaces, whilst the sample used for our econometric analysis includes 1,432 
workplaces due to missing data. The 2004 WERS comprises four main sections: the 
Management Questionnaire; the Worker Representative Questionnaire (which we do 
not use in this paper); the Financial Performance Questionnaire; and the Employee 
Questionnaire. The first three sections yield establishment level information, whilst 
the final section (the Employee Questionnaire) provides employee level information. 
Employee Questionnaire 
Up to 25 employees from each workplace were asked to complete the Employee 
Questionnaire yielding a sample of 17,008 employees after conditioning on missing 
data. The Employee Questionnaire contains information on a number of measures of 
employees’ attitudes towards both their job and their workplace. Two questions 
capture employee commitment and loyalty. Employees are asked to indicate how 
strongly they agree or disagree with each statement: (i) I share many values of my 
organisation and (ii) I feel loyal to my organisation. Responses to the former yield 
information pertaining to the individual’s commitment to their employer ( c ),2 whilst 
responses to the latter indicate the level of the individual’s loyalty to their 
                                                 
2 In one of the early studies in this area, Buchanan (1974) defines organisational commitment as being 
dedicated to the purposes and values of an organisation. The WERS survey question ties in with such a 
definition. 
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organisation ( l ). From this information, we have constructed two five point indices 
where 4 (0) represents the maximum (minimum) extent to which individuals agree 
with the above statements. The indices are defined as follows: 
4 4
3 3
2 / 2 /
1 1
0 0
wi wi
strongly agree (12.09%) strongly agree (20.51%)
agree (43.43%) agree (50.00%)
c lneither agree disagree (32.69%) neither agree disagr
disagree (9.21%)
strongly disagree (2.58%)
= =ì ì
ï ï= =ï ïï ï= == =í í
ï ï= =ï ï
= =ï ïî î
ee (19.77%)
disagree (7.12%)
strongly disagree (2.60%)
 
where i represents the individual subscript and w denotes the workplace subscript, i.e. 
wi denotes individual i employed by workplace w. The figures in parenthesis indicate 
the percentage in each category.3 Arguably, employees may be unable to distinguish 
between their commitment and their loyalty to the organisation, so following Green 
(2007), we adopt a hybrid combination of the two questions by generating an additive 
scale based upon Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0 to 4, where the scale of reliability 
is 0.77, which we term the commitment-loyalty index (CLI). The distribution across 
categories 0 to 4 are: 1.27%; 5.15%; 21.54%; 52.31% and 19.74% respectively.4 The 
first part of the empirical analysis, presented in Section 3, investigates the 
determinants of CLI at the employee level. If employee loyalty and commitment 
towards the workplace influence workplace performance, it is important to ascertain 
which employee and workplace characteristics are associated with employee 
commitment and loyalty. 
 
 
                                                 
3 It should be acknowledged that our analysis is based on self-reported data and the assumption that 
interpersonal comparisons can be made. The use of such data is becoming increasingly widespread in 
the economics literature and support for such data can be found in Guest (1990). In an early study, 
Hogan and Fleishman (1979) support the use of such data citing results from laboratory studies 
comparing perceived and actual effort exertion in physical activities. They report a highly significant 
positive correlation between actual metabolic rate and perceived effort in conducting a selection of 
occupational tasks.  
4 We have also conducted our analysis with categories 0 and 1 amalgamated. Our results are largely 
unchanged. 
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Management Questionnaire 
In Section 4, we conduct workplace level analysis in order to explore the determinants 
of labour productivity, financial performance and profits per employee at the 
workplace. The labour productivity and financial performance measures are derived 
from the following question included in the Management Questionnaire: I now want 
to ask you how your workplace is currently performing compared with other 
establishments in the same industry. How would you assess your workplace’s (i) 
financial performance and (ii) labour productivity? The management representative 
was asked to indicate in which of the following categories financial performance 
( wFP ) and labour productivity ( wLP )  lay: (i) a lot better than average; (ii) better than 
average; (iii) about average for the industry; (iv) below average or a lot below 
average. From the responses to these questions, we constructed two four point indices 
as follows: 
3 3
2 2
1 1
0 0
w w
A lot better than average (11.66%) A lot better than average (6.91%)
Better than average (40.50%) Better than average (42.18%)
FP LP
About average (39.11%) About average (44.90%)
Below average (8.73%) Bel
= =ì
ï = =ï= =í = =ï
ï = =î ow average (6.01%)
ì
ï
ï
í
ï
ïî
 
where w denotes the workplace subscript and the figures in parenthesis indicate the 
percentage in each category.  
Financial Performance Questionnaire 
After completion of the Management Questionnaire based on a face to face interview, 
a short Financial Performance Questionnaire was left for ‘someone responsible for 
financial matters at the workplace’ to complete. This could only proceed with the 
agreement of the management respondent and his/her ability and willingness to locate 
a suitable respondent to the Financial Performance Questionnaire [Chaplin et al. 
(2005)]. The number of workplaces where such questionnaires were placed totalled 
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2,076 where 1,070 were returned. Thus, the overall response rate for the Financial 
Performance Questionnaire (as a proportion of questionnaires placed) is 51.5% 
[Chaplin et al. (2005)].  
Notwithstanding the high attrition rate, the Financial Performance 
Questionnaire includes a continuous objective measure of financial performance, 
namely profits per head. There is evidence that both subjective and objective 
performance measures in WERS 2004 are weakly equivalent and produce similar 
results in fairly basic structural models (Forth and McNabb, 2007). Nevertheless, 
differences are evident and, as concerns about the use of subjective data are 
frequently raised (see, for example, Hamermesh, 2004), it is a prudent exercise to 
consider both types of performance measures in the present study. After observations 
with missing data have been omitted, we are left with a sub-sample of 495 workplaces 
for our analysis of profits per employee.5 Summary statistics for the variables used in 
our empirical analysis are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
3. Employee Level Analysis 
3.1 Methodology 
Given that employee CLI may influence workplace level performance, explored 
below in Section 4, we focus initially on the determinants of employee CLI. We 
conduct generalised ordered probit analysis in order to explore the correlates of CLI 
allowing for clustering within establishments.5 The generalised ordered probit model 
for CLI is modeled as follows: 
* '    wi wi wiCLI Zl h= +              (1) 
                                                 
5 The following analysis of the restricted sample of 495 workplaces is weighted making use of the 
weights detailed in Chaplin et al. (2005) based on the probability of workplaces taking part in WERS 
2004 responding to the Financial Performance Questionnaire. 
5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting that we adopt the generalised ordered probit 
approach, which is advantageous in that the cut-off points are allowed to vary between individuals in 
contrast to the standard ordered probit model. 
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where *wiCLI  is a latent variable denoting the unobserved propensity of individual i 
employed in workplace w to be committed-loyal to workplace w; wiCLI  is the 
individual’s observed level of commitment-loyalty; wiZ  is a vector of exogenous 
characteristics, which are expected to influence *wiCLI ; l  is the associated vector of 
coefficients; and wih  is a white noise error term.  
 In our set of explanatory variables, we include the individual’s industry-
occupation specific relative wage since, as efficiency wage models predict, an 
individual’s commitment and loyalty, as captured by CLI, to their employer may be 
influenced by the individual’s wage relative to the wage prevailing in their industry 
and occupation. An individual who receives low relative wages, for example, may be 
less likely to form an attachment to their employer.6 
 Other individual characteristics we control for are: age; gender; whether the 
individual is a member of a trade union; whether the employee works part-time; 
whether she/he is employed on a permanent contract; whether the individual’s 
performance is subject to regular appraisals; and tenure at the current workplace. 
Turning to workplace characteristics, monitoring and supervision play a 
prominent role in the organisational commitment literature. Hence, we include an 
index of the proportion of non-managerial staff with supervisory duties based on the 
responses to the following question: What proportion of non-managerial employees 
here have job duties that involve supervising other employees? Although, the 
supervision index serves to proxy the level of monitoring, it should be acknowledged 
                                                 
6 The industry-occupation specific relative wage is defined as the respondent’s weekly wage divided by 
the average weekly wage for the individual’s specific industry and occupation. We distinguish between 
nine occupational categories: professional; managerial; assistant professional; clerical; craft; personal; 
sales; operative and all other occupations. In terms of industry, we distinguish between eleven 
classifications: manufacturing; electrical; construction; wholesale; hotel; transport & communication; 
finance; public; education; health and other industries. Hence, there are ninety-nine industry-
occupation specific wage values. 
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that problems obtaining accurate measures of monitoring are well-documented. For 
example, Drago and Perlman (1989) note that supervision may occur for non-
monitoring purposes such as to co-ordinate production. Alternatively, the number of 
supervisors might be high because monitoring is difficult (Allgulin and Ellingsen, 
2002) or supervisors may only spend a fraction of their work time monitoring 
(Rebitzer, 1995). Despite such problems, the relative paucity of data compels us to 
rely on the proxy defined above. The inclusion of the dummy variable that equals one 
if the individual’s performance is regularly subject to appraisal represents an 
alternative control for monitoring. 
We also control for the number of dismissals, redundancies and suspensions at 
the workplace as a percentage of total employment within the workplace, which are 
expected to have a negative impact on commitment and loyalty. In addition, a dummy 
variable is included indicating whether the establishment has experienced difficulties 
filling vacancies for the individual’s occupation. Employee level workplace tenure 
acts as a control for organisation specific human capital, which may make it costly to 
leave the organisation and, hence, may serve to engender attachment to the firm. In a 
similar vein, we include a five point index denoting the extent managers agree with 
the statement: Employees are led to expect long-term employment in this 
organisation. The highest value of the index (4) indicates that managers strongly 
agree with the statement; a value of 3 denotes that they agree with the statement; a 
value of 2 indicates that they neither agree nor disagree; a value of 1 denotes that they 
disagree; finally, a value of 0 indicates that they strongly disagree. 
Other workplace characteristics we control for include workplace  size and a 
binary control indicating whether industrial action has been taken in the last twelve 
months at the workplace. It may be the case that the level of worker loyalty and 
commitment will be lower in establishments where there are poor industrial relations 
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and the overall unrest is high. In addition, we control for the employer’s perception of 
employee commitment. To be specific, we include a four point index indicating the 
extent to which managers agree with the following statement: Employees here are 
fully committed to the values of this organisation. The index takes the highest value 
(3) if the manager strongly agrees with the statement; a value of 2 if the manager 
agrees with the statement; a value of 1 if the manager neither agrees nor disagrees 
with the statement; and a value of 0 if the manager disagrees with the statement. 
Hence, the index is increasing in the manager’s perception of employee commitment. 
Finally, in order to explore alternative strategies that employers may adopt to 
encourage employee allegiance, we control for the presence of performance related 
pay and employee share ownership schemes at the workplace for the employee’s 
occupation. Also incorporated into the vector of control variables is workplace 
performance, since arguably high performance firms might inspire greater levels of 
CLI – this issue is further discussed in Section 4.3. 
3.2 Results 
The results of estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 1 where we focus on the 
marginal effects for each category from the lowest through to the highest level, i.e. 
categories 0 to 4, where the two extreme categories denote ‘strongly disagree’ and 
‘strongly agree’ respectively.7  Panels A to C incorporate alternative measures of 
workplace performance as control variables, where the full regression results are 
presented in Panel A with labour productivity included as a control variable, whilst in 
Panels B and C, for brevity, the regression results are summarised with financial 
                                                 
7 Estimated coefficients in ordered response models have no natural interpretation since the sign of the 
coefficient only uniquely determines the change in probability at the top and bottom categories of the 
dependent variable, see Greene (2003). Hence, we follow convention and focus on the marginal effects. 
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performance and profits per employee included to control for workplace performance, 
respectively.8 
 With respect to the individual’s relative wage, a one per cent increase in the 
log relative wage increases the probability that the individual reports the highest 
category for CLI by 2.7 percentage points, see Table 1 Panel A. Our empirical 
findings suggest that comparisons between an employee’s wage and that of a 
particular reference group are significant determinants of worker commitment and 
loyalty to the workplace, which is consistent with efficiency wage theory, although 
the magnitude of the implied relationship is moderate.9 
 Employee characteristics, specifically age and gender, play the largest role in 
terms of the magnitude of the marginal effects across the CLI thresholds. Turning to 
other employee characteristics, the length of time with the current employer is also 
significantly associated with CLI. The effects of tenure at the workplace indicate that 
individuals with shorter tenure are less committed and loyal relative to the reference 
category of being employed for more than 10 years at the same workplace. This may 
be because such individuals have not acquired high levels of workplace specific 
human capital, which may make leaving the workplace less costly. Alternatively, it 
may simply be that people who do not generate feelings of commitment and loyalty 
are more likely to quit their jobs. Part time employees are also less likely to harbour 
high levels of CLI. 
 Turning to workplace characteristics, the proportion of workers with 
supervisory duties is significantly associated with CLI. Specifically, the level of 
supervision decreases (increases) the probability that the individual is in the lowest 
                                                 
8 We have also estimated equation (1) via a random effects ordered probit specification where the 
results are largely in line with those reported in Table 1. 
9 The distribution of the employee’s wage relative to the industry-occupation specific wage in WERS 
2004 is consistent with corresponding employee relative wage distributions calculated from the British 
Household Panel Survey 2004 and Labour Force Survey 2004. 
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(highest) categories of CLI. There is also some evidence that performance related pay 
has a degree of influence upon employee commitment and loyalty. Long term 
employment prospects within the workplace have a monotonic positive influence 
upon engendering higher levels of CLI: at the mean of the index of long term 
employment prospects, the probability that the individual reports the highest category 
of CLI is around 2 percentage points. Interestingly, there are no statistically 
significant effects from the percentage of dismissals or suspensions, industrial action 
or employee share ownership at the workplace.  
 Trade union membership is found to lower the probability that an employee 
will respond in the top categories of CLI. This finding is consistent with the literature 
on unions and absenteeism (Chaudhury and Ng, 1992 and Leigh, 1981; 1985), which 
shows that union members go absent more often than non-union employees. One 
possible explanation for such a finding is that union members may have a stronger 
sense of security at work.  
 Having ascertained which employee and employer characteristics engender 
employee commitment and loyalty to the workplace, the following analysis 
investigates whether the average level of employee CLI within the workplace 
influences workplace performance. 
4. Workplace Performance 
4.1 Methodology 
The following workplace performance models are estimated where the average level 
of the employee commitment-loyalty index (CLI) within the workplace, wCLI , is 
included in the set of explanatory variables: 
*
1 1'    ww w wLP X CLIb g n= + +            (2) 
*
2 2'    ww w wFP X CLIj g n= + +            (3) 
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3 3'    ww w wX CLIq g nP = + +             (4) 
where *wLP  and 
*
wFP  represent two latent variables denoting the unobserved 
propensity of workplace w to achieve a certain level of labour productivity and 
financial performance respectively in terms of the subjective measures of 
performance; wP  represents profits per employee, the objective measure of 
performance; wX  is a vector of workplace characteristics expected to influence 
*
wFP , 
*
wLP  and wP  ; b , j , q , 1g , 2g  and 3g  are the associated vectors of coefficients; and 
jwn  (j=1,2,3) are random error terms. Thus, the estimated coefficients of wCLI  
indicate the nature of the relationship between average employee CLI within the 
workplace and the measures of workplace performance.10 Equations (2) and (3) are 
estimated via a generalised ordered probit specification over the sample of 1,432 
workplaces, whilst equation (4) is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) over the 
sample of 495 workplaces. 
The vector of explanatory variables, wX , is based on the existing literature 
and includes: quadratics in workplace size and workplace age; controls for whether 
the firm is foreign owned or a UK multinational; industrial affiliation; controls for the 
presence of performance related pay or employee share ownership at the workplace; 
the average industry-occupation specific relative wage in the workplace (as defined in 
Section 3) denoted by RW ; a dummy indicator for whether there is a recognised 
trade union at the workplace; a public sector dummy variable;11 and the percentages 
                                                 
10 We have also investigated incorporating commitment and loyalty simultaneously as two separate 
measures: only commitment was statistically significant. However, if entered separately, both 
commitment and loyalty were found to be significantly associated with workplace performance. These 
results are available from the authors upon request. This suggests that employees may not be able to 
discern the difference between the two survey questions and, hence, supports the use of a hybrid 
measure. 
11 We have also undertaken the empirical analysis excluding the public sector, with the key findings 
generally unchanged. These results are available on request. However, 20% of the sample of 
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of unskilled, female and ethnic minority employees in the workplace. As a proxy for 
the relative importance of labour costs within the workplace, we also include a four 
point index indicating the percentage of the workplace’s sales revenue or operating 
costs, accounted for by wages, salaries and other labour costs such as pensions and 
insurance.12  
4.2 Results 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating the relationship between workplace 
performance and CLI , with the results of estimating equations (2), (3) and (4) 
summarised in Panel A. It is apparent from Panel A that, for our sample of 1,432 
workplaces, employee CLI  is positively associated with higher levels of the three 
measures of workplace performance.13 Due to the ordered nature of the labour 
productivity and financial performance indices, we focus on the marginal effects for 
each category, lowest through to highest, i.e. categories 0 to 3, where the two extreme 
categories denote ‘below average’ and ‘a lot above average’, respectively.  
 With respect to labour productivity, wLP , shown in the first column of Table 2, 
the marginal effects presented in Panel A indicate that CLI  is associated with a 
decrease (an increase) in the probability that workplace labour productivity is ‘below 
average’ (‘a lot above average’). Indeed, evaluated at the sample means, the 
                                                                                                                                             
workplaces are in the public sector, hence excluding such workplaces significantly reduces our sample 
size, particularly in the case of the continuous measure of financial performance. Moreover, substantial 
variation exists in the mean level of each measure of performance within the public sector where the 
standard deviations for labour productivity, financial performance and profits per employee are: 0.667, 
0.729 and 2.137 respectively (for comparison see Table A1 in the Appendix for the overall sample). 
12 In terms of the labour cost index, a value of zero denotes less than 25%; one denotes 25% to 50%; 
two denotes 50% to 75%; and three denotes 75% or more. The index indicating the proportion of sales 
revenue or operating costs accounted for by labour costs enables us to proxy the importance of labour 
costs relative to the costs of other factor inputs. 
13 For brevity, we omit the full results of estimating the alternative models of workplace performance. 
In accordance with the existing literature, our findings suggest that workplace size, whether the 
workplace has performance related pay or employee share ownership all increase the probability of 
having the highest level of financial performance. Conversely, workplace age, a high proportion of 
labour costs relative to sales revenue and the proportion of ethnic employees decrease the probability of 
attaining high workplace performance. These results are available from the authors on request. 
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magnitude of the effects of the employee commitment-loyalty index are 9 and 8 
percentage points at the two extremes of the index respectively.15 We replicate the 
above analysis focusing on the alternative subjective measure of workplace 
performance – financial performance ( wFP ) in the second major column of Table 2. 
The results are consistent with those found for labour productivity in that higher 
levels of CLI  are associated with a decrease in the probability of financial 
performance being ‘below average’. Evaluated at the sample mean, the largest effect 
of CLI  serves to increase the probability that workplace financial performance is 
‘above average’ by 15 percentage points. The final column of Table 2, which focuses 
upon a sub-sample of 495 workplaces reporting profits per employee, again reveals a 
positive association between workplace performance and employee commitment and 
loyalty. 
 In order to explore the robustness of our findings, we replace CLI  with the 
four point index of the level of employee commitment perceived by the manager 
taken from the Management Questionnaire as defined in Section 3. The results are 
shown in Panel B of Table 2 and reveal a positive association between higher 
employee commitment as perceived by the manager and workplace performance, 
although the effect on the continuous measure of profits per employee is insignificant. 
 To summarise, our workplace results thus far suggest that employee 
commitment and loyalty are positively related to higher levels of labour productivity 
and financial performance at the workplace. Moreover, the magnitudes of the 
                                                 
15 These calculations are based on the mean sample characteristics of workplaces. For example, the 9 
percentage point effect is calculated by multiplying the marginal effect by the mean of average CLI. 
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estimated effects suggest that worker attachment to the organisation is an important 
conduit for improved performance.14  
4.3 Robustness 
In this sub-section we further consider the robustness of the estimated relationship 
between CLI and workplace performance. First, we investigate the possibility of 
reverse causality between CLI and performance, i.e. the potential for high 
performance organisations to engender greater levels of CLI, by employing an 
instrumental variables approach. Secondly, we make use of the panel element of 
WERS, which enables us to analyse the change in workplace performance over the 
period 1998 to 2004 and how this is influenced by CLI in 1998 arguably enabling a 
causal hypothesis to be tested. Finally, the potential simultaneity between the relative 
wage and CLI is explored, in that relative wages may also directly influence 
workplace performance as well as having an indirect effect via workers’ commitment 
and loyalty to the organisation.  
Reverse causality between CLI and workplace performance 
Initially, we explore reverse causality by instrumenting CLI, based upon the analysis 
presented in Section 3 above. To be specific, in the performance equations, i.e. 
equations (2), (3) and (4), we replace CLI , i.e. the average exogenous CLI for each 
workplace, with the average predicted CLI for each workplace, where predicted CLI  
                                                 
14 Workplaces which indicated that it was not possible to make comparisons about labour productivity 
or financial performance or that the relevant data were not available were excluded from our sample 
(approximately 32%). We have experimented with recoding the missing values in the dependent 
variable by including these workplaces in the ‘about average’ category, which increases the sample 
size to over 2,100. Testing the difference in the estimated coefficients between the estimates reported in 
Table 2 and those based upon the larger sample size reveals no significant difference in the estimated 
relationship between CLI and performance at the 1% level. Similarly, for the employee level results, 
the sample size of 17,008 employees is governed by the number of workplaces we analyse and, in 
addition, whether employees respond to the commitment and loyalty questions, i.e. the dependent 
variable. We have experimented with recoding missing values in CLI in the employee level data to the 
“neither agree/disagree” category, yielding a sample size over 21,100 employees. The results reported 
in Table 1 are largely unaffected. Indeed, testing the difference between the estimated coefficients from 
equation (1) estimated across 17,008 employees and that for 21,100 employees, we find no significant 
difference at the 5% level. 
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is based on the employee level specifications presented in Table 1, i.e. equation (1). 
Thus, employee characteristics are incorporated into the employee level CLI model as 
well as workplace level control variables. This is an advantageous approach in that it 
may alleviate potential bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, which might affect both 
sides of the regression equation, i.e. CLI and the workplace performance measures, 
Green (2007). Moreover, as can be seen from the results presented in Section 3, we 
also condition CLI upon workplace performance. The results shown in Table 1 
suggest that performance measured by either of the subjective measures, labour 
productivity (Panel A) and financial performance (Panel B), or the objective measure 
of performance profits per employee (Panel C), does not have a significant impact 
upon CLI. Such findings suggest that workplace performance is not a statistically 
significant determinant of employee CLI. 
We then re-estimate equations (2), (3) and (4) replacing CLI  with the average 
predicted CLI for each workplace. The analysis based upon the predicted or 
instrumented CLI shown in Table 2 Panel C reveals a positive association between 
employee commitment and loyalty and the measures of performance. There is a 
significant effect for average predicted CLI at both extremes of the subjective 
measures, but not upon profits per employee.15 Indeed, evaluated at the sample mean, 
the magnitude of the effects of average predicted CLI upon the probability that the 
workplace experiences labour productivity ‘above average’ is 8 percentage points, 
similar in magnitude to that found in Section 4.2. The finding that none of the three 
                                                 
15 We find an insignificant relationship when the residuals from the performance equations, i.e. 
equations (2), (3) and (3), are regressed on the explanatory variables, averaged at the workplace level, 
used in equation (1), which are not included in equations (2), (3) and (4).  
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measures of workplace performance affect CLI in the employee level analysis and that 
average predicted CLI influences performance is in accordance with a causal effect.16 
CLI and the change in workplace performance 
We explore the issue of causality between workplace performance and CLI  in an 
alternative manner by making use of the panel element within WERS. We analyse a 
subset of workplaces interviewed in both 1998 and 2004: there are 522 workplaces in 
both waves with information on the key variables in question. To be specific, we 
explore the effect of CLI  measured in 1998 upon the change in financial performance 
between 1998 and 2004, denoted by ,2004wFPERD . Arguably, any significant 
association between these variables is evidence of CLI  influencing workplace 
performance rather than workplace performance influencing CLI . Information on 
financial performance in the panel aspect of WERS is only available as a subjective 
measure defined by an ordered variable as: 0 if the change in financial performance is 
below the industry average; 1 if the change in financial performance is equal to the 
industry average; and 2 if the change in financial performance is above the industry 
average. The following model is estimated as a generalised ordered probit where we 
condition upon variables measured in 1998:17 
,1998,2004 ,1998' ww w wFPER X CLIa g uD = + +       (5) 
The results of estimating equation (5) are presented in Table 3 Panel A and reveal 
that, based upon the sample means, CLI  decreases the probability that the workplace 
                                                 
16 We have also explored an alternative modelling strategy, which entails joint modelling of average 
commitment and loyalty at the workplace and performance. To be specific, we adopt a bivariate probit 
model where one binary dependent variable equals 1 if the average CLI is in the highest two categories 
and the second binary dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the subjective performance measure 
(either labour productivity or financial performance) lies in one of the highest two categories. For the 
case of the continuous measure of performance, we adopt a two stage probit least squares estimator. 
Our findings are in accordance with the results in Table 2 Panel C with the positive effect of employee 
commitment and loyalty on performance prevailing with the joint estimation procedure. 
17 The findings are robust to changing the control variables to 2004, or indeed creating differenced 
control variables across time where applicable. 
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experiences a change in financial performance below (above) the industry average in 
the region of 38 (11) percentage points. As a further robustness check, we also 
instrument CLI  in 1998, based upon the specification of control variables used in 
Section 3 above – but measured in 1998. The results shown in Table 3 Panel B reveal 
that the relationship between average predicted CLI in 1998 and workplace 
performance remains after instrumentation.  
Reverse causality between CLI and relative wages 
Our final robustness check focuses on the possible simultaneity between relative 
wages and workplace performance. Arguably, it is possible that higher levels of 
performance might lead to higher wages, which might also influence the relative 
wage, akin to rent sharing arguments (Blanchflower et al., 1996). To consider whether 
relative wages influence workplace performance in estimating equations (2), (3) and 
(4), the average workplace relative wage ( RW ) was incorporated into the financial 
performance models. The marginal effects associated with the relative wage ( RW ) 
are shown in Table 2 Panel A. For each measure of financial performance, there is no 
significant direct relationship between the average relative wage and workplace 
performance, only an indirect influence operating through CLI as is evident from the 
analysis presented in Section 3, i.e. the positive relationship between the relative 
industry-occupation wage and CLI.  
To investigate the possible simultaneity between average relative wages and 
workplace performance, we undertake a simultaneous modeling approach. 
Specifically we adopt a two-stage probit least squares estimator as follows: 
* ' ww w wF X RW vm q= + +   
*' ww w wRW H Fg f e= + +         (6) 
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where the average relative wage across employees within the workplace, wRW , is 
modeled as a continuous variable, whilst workplace performance (either labour 
productivity or workplace financial performance) is treated as a binary variable which 
takes the value of one if the workplace has performance “above average” or “a lot 
above average”. The estimates derived from this framework are consistent and have 
corrected standard errors (see Maddala, 1983). The explanatory variables in vector 
wH  include controls averaged across employees within the workplace: tenure at the 
current workplace, part-time employment, permanent contract, trade union 
membership, gender, marital status, ethnicity and highest educational qualification.18 
In the case of financial performance measured by profits per employee, which is a 
continuous variable, a standard two stage least squared approach is adopted. Under a 
rent-sharing type argument, we might expect f  to be positive and significant. 
 The results are presented in Table 4, where the first two columns show the 
results of estimating equation (6) for labour productivity and financial performance 
respectively. Table 4 is split into two panels with Panel A reporting the results of the 
effect of instrumented relative wages and CLI upon workplace performance and Panel 
B reporting the effects of instrumented financial performance upon the relative wage. 
Clearly, across the subjective measures of workplace performance, when estimated 
simultaneously, the average relative wage within the workplace has no significant 
impact upon workplace performance. This finding accords with that reported in Table 
2 Panel A where the relative wage was treated as an exogenous variable. Similarly, as 
shown in Table 4 Panel B, the three instrumented measures of financial performance 
have no impact upon the average relative wage within the workplace. In the final 
column of Table 4, for the subset of 495 workplaces with information on profits per 
                                                 
18 To specify H, we include control variables associated with standard Mincerian earnings functions, 
since the dependent variable is the average within each workplace of the employee’s wage weighted by 
the relevant specific industry-occupation wage.  
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employee, when estimating this measure of workplace performance simultaneously 
with the relative wages by two stage least squares, there is no significant impact of 
relative wages (workplace performance) upon workplace performance (relative 
wages). Thus, it would appear that there is no direct simultaneity between workplace 
performance and relative wages. Our findings suggest that relative wages only have 
an indirect influence upon workplace performance operating through commitment and 
loyalty, i.e. CLI, which is contradictory to a rent sharing argument but consistent with 
efficiency wage theory.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have analysed matched employer-employee data in order to explore 
the influence of employee commitment and loyalty on workplace performance. Our 
empirical findings suggest that employee commitment and loyalty are positively 
associated with higher levels of workplace performance. Arguably, it is thus in an 
establishment’s interest to foster such attachments. Hence, our empirical analysis 
highlights a potential avenue for productivity and financial gains at the establishment 
level, which has been somewhat neglected in the economics literature. Moreover, our 
employee level analysis of the determinants of employee attitudes suggests not only a 
role for worker characteristics, but also for workplace characteristics (such as 
supervision, performance related pay and long term prospects of employment) in 
influencing such attachments. Such findings suggest that establishments may be able 
to exert some control over the loyalty and commitment of its workforce, which, in 
turn, may enhance establishment performance. 
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 Table 1: The Determinants of Employee Commitment and Loyalty: Employee Level Analysis 
PANEL A: SUBJECTIVE MEASURE OF WORKPLACE PERFORMANCE – LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
 CLI=0: Strongly 
Disagree 
CLI=1: Disagree CLI=2: Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
CLI=3: Agree CLI=4: Strongly Agree 
Employee Characteristics M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Log Relative Wage (RW) -0.0009 (1.15) -0.0044 (2.28) -0.0267 (7.10) 0.0053 (2.20) 0.0267 (7.60) 
Male 0.0092 (4.87) 0.0195 (5.41) 0.0321 (4.27) -0.0421 (4.97) -0.0187 (2.59) 
Part Time 0.0005 (0.23) -0.0027 (0.58) 0.0202 (2.13) 0.0282 (2.66) -0.0463 (6.01) 
Age 16-17 0.8471 (12.05) -0.7194 (7.11) 0.2077 (2.38) -0.2097 (2.90) -0.1257 (2.59) 
Age 18-19 0.8506 (19.11) -0.7346 (8.69) 0.2923 (3.72) -0.2617 (4.20) -0.1466 (5.85) 
Age 20-21 0.8793 (25.38) -0.7380 (8.43) 0.2717 (3.26) -0.2688 (4.49) -0.1442 (10.05) 
Age 22-29 0.7551 (21.17) -0.6022 (7.43) 0.2384 (3.23) -0.2459 (4.10) -0.1453 (9.32) 
Age 30-39 0.5971 (14.68) -0.4996 (7.51) 0.2427 (3.83) -0.2177 (3.62) -0.1224 (7.09) 
Age 40-49 0.6207 (15.43) -0.5286 (8.16) 0.2114 (3.40) -0.1966 (3.25) -0.1069 (4.62) 
Age 50-59 0.6400 (14.95) -0.5541 (8.18) 0.2076 (3.24) -0.1979 (3.22) -0.0956 (3.83) 
Age 60-64 0.8054 (17.67) -0.7305 (9.01) 0.1233 (1.74) -0.1383 (2.07) -0.0599 (3.52) 
Tenure: tenure <1 year 0.0013 (0.38) 0.0262 (5.30) 0.0393 (3.61) -0.0340 (2.46) -0.0303 (2.52) 
Tenure: 1 year £  tenure < 2 years 0.0024 (0.69) 0.0193 (3.74) 0.0258 (2.31) -0.0391 (2.80) -0.0037 (0.32) 
Tenure: 2 years £  tenure < 5 years 0.0023 (0.90) -0.0140 (3.08) -0.0112 (1.24) 0.0112 (1.01) 0.0117 (1.28) 
Tenure: 5 years £  tenure < 10 years -0.0011 (0.49) -0.0067 (1.41) -0.0029 (0.29) 0.0168 (1.40) -0.0062 (0.64) 
Permanent Contract -0.0003 (0.12) -0.0094 (1.34) -0.0017 (0.13) 0.0034 (0.21) 0.0080 (0.66) 
Trade Union Member 0.0055 (2.78) 0.0175 (4.19) 0.0235 (3.07) -0.0197 (2.31) -0.0269 (3.65) 
Regular Performance Appraisal -0.0014 (0.81) -0.0051 (1.24) 0.0003 (0.04) 0.0089 (0.99) -0.0028 (0.32) 
Workplace  Characteristics           
Log Workplace Size -0.0003 (0.10) 0.0062 (0.92) 0.0319 (2.48) 0.0090 (0.61) -0.0467 (3.58) 
Log  Workplace  Size Squared 0.0001 (0.17) -0.0005 (0.80) -0.0027 (2.15) 0.0001 (0.03) 0.0031 (2.44) 
Percentage of Dismissals 0.0001 (0.17) 0.0008 (1.55) 0.0004 (0.31) -0.0007 (0.64) -0.0005 (0.60) 
Percentage of Redundancies 0.0001 (1.67) 0.0009 (5.10) 0.0013 (2.19) -0.0011 (2.47) -0.0012 (2.57) 
Percentage of Suspensions 0.0001 (0.03) 0.0069 (1.57) -0.0049 (0.51) -0.0002 (0.02) -0.0019 (0.21) 
Index of % Supervisors -0.0021 (2.90) -0.0043 (2.43) -0.0031 (0.88) 0.0005 (0.12) 0.0091 (2.61) 
Vacancy Difficulties at Workplace 0.0023 (0.83) -0.0014 (0.24) 0.0219 (1.68) -0.0163 (1.08) -0.0065 (0.53) 
Performance Related Pay -0.0036 (2.31) 0.0051 (1.29) -0.0072 (0.89) 0.0117 (2.34) -0.0059 (0.73) 
Industrial Action in Last 12 Months -0.0034 (1.43) 0.0053 (0.71) 0.0106 (0.70) -0.0088 (0.51) -0.0038 (0.22) 
Employers’ perception of commitment -0.0054 (4.57) -0.0186 (5.90) -0.0556 (8.86) 0.0218 (3.22) 0.0578 (9.11) 
Long-term employment prospects in workplace  -0.0001 (1.91) -0.0035 (1.73) 0.0017 (0.37) 0.0037 (1.93) 0.0081 (2.82) 
Labour productivity -0.0003 (0.27) -0.0044 (1.67) -0.0078 (1.38) -0.0001 (0.01) 0.0126 (1.16) 
Chi Squared 2328.88  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 17,008 
 
Table 1 (Continued): The Determinants of Employee Commitment and Loyalty: Employee Level Analysis 
PANEL B: SUBJECTIVE MEASURE OF WORKPLACE  PERFORMANCE – FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 CLI=0: Strongly Disagree CLI=1: Disagree CLI=2: Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
CLI=3: Agree CLI=4: Strongly Agree 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Log Relative Wage (RW) -0.0008 (1.14) -0.0044 (2.28) -0.0266 (7.08) 0.0051 (2.16) 0.0267 (7.61)
Workplace  Financial 
Performance 
-0.0005 (0.58) -0.0009 (0.40) -0.0098 (2.12) 0.0029 (0.57) 0.0084 (1.63)
Controls As in Table 1 Panel A 
Chi Squared 2,245.93  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 17,008 
PANEL C: OBJECTIVE MEASURE OF WORKPLACE  PERFORMANCE – LOG PROFITS PER EMPLOYEE 
 CLI=0: Strongly Disagree CLI=1: Disagree CLI=2: Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
CLI=3: Agree CLI=4: Strongly Agree 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Log Relative Wage (RW) 0.0009 (0.16) -0.0018 (0.58) -0.0302 (5.12) 0.0071 (1.99) 0.0249 (4.38)
Log Profits per Employee -0.0001 (0.27) 0.0002 (0.16) -0.0024 (0.84) -0.0018 (0.73) 0.0041 (1.13)
Controls As in Table 1 Panel A 
Chi Squared 615.60  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 6,681 
Notes: M.E. Denotes marginal effect. Results are from a generalised ordered probit specification allowing for clustering effects within workplaces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Relationship between Workplace  Performance and Employee CLI : Workplace Level Analysis 
PANEL A: AVERAGE EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT-LOYALTY INDEX WITHIN THE WORKPLACE  
 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (LP) FINANCIAL PRODUCTIVITY (FP) 
 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
PROFITS PER 
EMPLOYEE 
CLI  -0.0354 
(2.98) 
-0.0560 
(2.87) 
0.0619 
(2.05) 
0.0294 
(2.03) 
-0.0362 
(2.24) 
-0.0172 
(0.58) 
0.0557 
(2.83) 
-0.0023 
(0.11) 
0.3993 
(1.97) 
RW  -0.0038 
(0.55) 
-0.0042 
(0.29) 
0.0040 
(0.28) 
0.0041 
(0.63) 
-0.0108 
(1.37) 
-0.0011 
(0.08) 
-0.0010 
(0.08) 
0.0129 
(1.47) 
0.0008 
(0.10) 
Wald Chi Squared 108.25  p=[0.000] 147.69  p=[0.000] – 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0324 0.0401 – 
F Statistic – – 2.74  p=[0.000] 
R Squared – – 0.1934 
PANEL B: EMPLOYERS’ PERCEPTION OF EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT  
 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (LP) FINANCIAL PRODUCTIVITY (FP) 
 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
PROFITS PER 
EMPLOYEE 
Commitment -0.0287 
(4.30) 
-0.1062 
(5.88) 
0.1101 
(6.10) 
0.0249 
(2.69) 
-0.0419 
(5.17) 
-0.0290 
(1.98) 
0.0302 
(2.76) 
0.0406 
(3.78) 
0.0354 
(0.25) 
Wald Chi Squared 165.56  p=[0.000] 202.45  p=[0.000] – 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0539 0.0548 – 
F Statistic – – 2.75  p=[0.000] 
R Squared – – 0.1808 
PANEL C: AVERAGE PREDICTED EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT-LOYALTY INDEX WITHIN THE WORKPLACE  
 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (LP) FINANCIAL PRODUCTIVITY (FP) 
 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
PROFITS PER 
EMPLOYEE 
Predicted CLI  -0.0185 
(1.43) 
-0.1238 
(3.41) 
0.1024 
(2.77) 
0.0400 
(2.13) 
-0.0342 
(2.91) 
-0.0028 
(0.08) 
0.0096 
(0.26) 
0.0274 
(2.37) 
0.1585 
(1.63) 
Wald Chi Squared 105.24  p=[0.000] 140.29  p=[0.000] – 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0326 0.0394 – 
F Statistic – – 4.87  p=[0.000] 
R Squared – – 0.0791 
OBSERVATIONS 1,432 495 
Notes: Marginal effects are shown for LP and FP, whilst estimated coefficients are shown for profits per employee. T statistics are shown in parenthesis. A generalised ordered probit 
specification is used to model LP and FP, whilst OLS is used to model profits per employee. Controls include: average relative wage; quadratic in workplace  size; quadratic in workplace  
age; index of labour costs as a proportion of sales revenue; proportions of females, ethnic origin, unskilled; foreign ownership; UK multinational; trade union recognition; performance 
related pay or employee share ownership; public sector and industry dummy variables. 
 
 
 
Table 3: The Relationship between the Change in Financial Performance over 1998 to 2004 and CLI: Workplace Level Panel Analysis 
PANEL A: AVERAGE EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT-LOYALTY INDEX WITHIN THE WORKPLACE MEASURED IN 1998 
 Change in financial 
performance (1998-2004) 
below industry average 
 Change in financial 
performance (1998-2004) 
equal to industry average 
 Change in financial 
performance (1998-2004) 
above industry average 
 M.E. TSTAT   M.E. TSTAT   M.E. TSTAT 
CLI  -0.1320 (2.04)   0.0962 (1.46)   0.0358 (2.60) 
Wald Chi Squared 103.71    p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1506 
PANEL B: AVERAGE PREDICTED EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT-LOYALTY INDEX WITHIN THE WORKPLACE MEASURED IN 1998  
 Change in financial 
performance (1998-2004) 
below industry average 
 Change in financial 
performance (1998-2004) 
equal to industry average 
 Change in financial 
performance (1998-2004) 
above industry average 
 M.E. TSTAT   M.E. TSTAT   M.E. TSTAT 
Predicted CLI  -0.1356 (2.28)   0.0324 (1.10)   0.0679 (2.29) 
Wald Chi Squared 102.38    p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1516 
OBSERVATIONS 522 
Notes: M.E. denotes marginal effect. Results are from a generalised ordered probit specification. Controls are: average relative wage; quadratic in workplace  size; quadratic in workplace  
age; index of labour costs as a proportion of sales revenue; proportions of females, ethnic origin, unskilled; foreign ownership; UK multinational; trade union recognition; performance related 
pay or employee share ownership; public sector and industry dummy variables. 
 
 
 Table 4: The Relationship between Workplace  Performance and Relative Wages: Two Stage Estimation: Workplace Level Analysis 
 TWO STAGE PROBIT LEAST SQUARES TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES 
PANEL A: STAGE 2 DL=1 if Labour Productivity Above 
Average  (i.e. LP>=2) 
DP=1 if Financial Performance Above 
Average (i.e FP>=2) Profits per Employee 
Instrumented RW  0.0176 (0.50) 0.0307 (0.87) -0.8532 (1.51) 
CLI  0.2208 (2.95) 0.1243 (2.67) 0.0232 (1.87) 
Log Likelihood Ratio 49.22  p=[0.000] 59.48  p=[0.000] – 
Pseudo R squared 0.0248 0.0300 – 
F Statistic – – 2.63  p=[0.000] 
Adjusted R Squared – – 0.0689 
PANEL B: STAGE 1 Log Relative Wage RW  Log Relative Wage RW  Log Relative Wage RW  
Instrumented DL 0.0241 (0.67) – – – – 
Instrumented DP – – 0.3832 (0.74) – – 
Instrumented Profits – – – – 0.0006 (0.05) 
CLI  0.1966 (2.54) 0.0878 (2.54) 0.1221 (2.13) 
F Statistic 13.13  p=[0.000] 12.04  p=[0.000] 3.24  p=[0.000] 
Adjusted R squared 0.1387 0.1394 0.0790 
OBSERVATIONS 1,432 495 
Notes: (i) Coefficients are shown with T statistics in parenthesis. (ii) Control variables used in stage 1 for the two stage probit least squares are proportion of employees within the 
workplace: in each tenure group; in each highest education category; male; single; white. (iii) Control variables used in stage 2 for the two stage probit least squares and standard two 
stage least squares are: quadratics in workplace size and workplace age; index of labour costs as a proportion of sales revenue; proportions of females, ethnic origin, unskilled; 
foreign ownership; UK multinational; trade union recognition; performance related pay or employee share ownership; public sector and industry dummy variables.  
Table A1: Summary Statistics 
 MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
Workplace Level Analysis     
Financial Performance (FP) 1.5509 0.8097 0 3 
Labour Productivity (LP) 1.5001 0.7132 0 3 
Log Profits per Employee  -2.0689 2.5957 -10.4070 36.4491 
Average Commitment Loyalty Index ( CLI ) 2.9581 0.4680 0 4 
Average Relative Wage Paid in Workplace  ( RW ) 4.5551 1.0127 1.6510 10.7376 
OBSERVATIONS 1,432 
Employee Level Analysis     
Employee Characteristics     
Employee Commitment Loyalty Index (CLI) 2.8218 0.8493 0 4 
Log Relative Industry-Occupational Wage  (RW) 4.2202 0.9801 -2.1501 12.9457 
Male 0.4739 0.4993 0 1 
Part Time 0.2079 0.4059 0 1 
Age 16-17 0.0098 0.0989 0 1 
Age 18-19 0.0219 0.1467 0 1 
Age 20-21 0.0259 0.1589 0 1 
Age 22-29 0.1565 0.3634 0 1 
Age 30-39 0.2538 0.4352 0 1 
Age 40-49 0.2682 0.4430 0 1 
Age 50-59 0.2197 0.4141 0 1 
Age 60-64 0.0368 0.1884 0 1 
Tenure: tenure <1 year 0.1552 0.3622 0 1 
Tenure: 1 year £  tenure < 2 years 0.1274 0.3335 0 1 
Tenure: 2 years £  tenure < 5 years 0.2649 0.4413 0 1 
Tenure: 5 years £  tenure < 10 years 0.1877 0.3905 0 1 
Permanent Contract 0.9235 0.2658 0 1 
Trade Union Member 0.3715 0.4832 0 1 
Regular Performance Appraisal 0.7091 0.4542 0 1 
Workplace Characteristics     
Log Workplace Size 4.8406 1.5773 1.6094 8.7979 
Log Workplace Size Squared 25.9188 16.1929 2.5903 77.4022 
Percentage of Dismissals 1.1343 3.1136 0 100 
Percentage of Redundancies 2.1030 8.7708 0 100 
Percentage of Suspensions 4.2815 4.9483 0 100 
Index of  % Supervisors 1.5980 1.0814 0 6 
Vacancy Difficulties at Workplace 0.1170 0.3214 0 1 
Performance Related Pay 0.3613 0.4804 0 1 
Industrial Action in Last 12 Months 0.0800 0.2713 0 1 
Employers’ perception of commitment 1.8653 0.6727 0 3 
Long-term employment prospects in workplace  3.0175 0.8947 0 4 
OBSERVATIONS 17,008 
 
